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Abstract—Studying network robustness for wireless sensor
networks(WSNs) is an exciting topic of research as sensor nodes
often fail due to hardware degradation, resource constraints, and
environmental changes. The application of spectral graph theory
to networked systems has generated several important results.
However, previous research has often failed to consider the
network parameters, which is crucial to study the real network
applications. Network criticality is one of the effective metrics to
quantify the network robustness against such failures and attacks.
In this work, we derive the exact formulas of network criticality
for WSNs using r-nearest neighbor networks and we show the
effect of nearest neighbors and network dimension on robustness
using analytical and numerical evaluations. Furthermore, we also
show how symmetric and static approximations can wrongly
designate the network robustness when implemented to WSNs.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks, r-nearest neighbor
networks, Network Robustness, Network Criticality, Spectral
graph theory
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks play a significant rolein applications such as healthcare monitoring,
environmental sensing, fire detection, disaster prevention, etc.
However, nodes in WSNs prone to failures due to hardware
degradation, resource constraints, and environmental changes
[1]. The reliability of WSNs is rely on continuing its
operations when a fraction of nodes are damaged [2], [3].
Structural robustness of a network is defined as the ability
of a network to maintain its connectivity against failures
or attacks [4], [5]. Studies of network robustness under
intentional attacks and failures have received a growing
interest in the recent years (see, e.g., [6]- [7]). In [6], authors
argued that node connectivity is the most suitable graph
theoretic metric to study the robustness in the face of node
failures. Based on different heuristics, various measures
have been proposed to quantify the network robustness,
such as natural connectivity [8], network criticality [9],
algebraic connectivity [10], etc. Although, these measures
are useful to quantify the network robustness, they cannot
be applied to large-scale networks due to high computational
complexity. This also implies that these measures are of no
great practical use within the context of WSNs. Many studies
have been discussed to optimize the network robustness. In
[11], a tabu search algorithm has been proposed to optimize
the network robustness by rewiring the links. Altering the
edge connections between low degree nodes can improve
the network robustness against intentional attacks [12].
Nonetheless, these approaches are only suitable for small
to medium-scale networks. To capture the small topological
changes in network caused by network component’s failures, a
new measure has been proposed based on information theory
[7]. A measure for evaluating network robustness for time
varying networks has been proposed in [13] and it has been
shown that temporal robustness gives more realistic results
over static approaches. Although there have been several
studies on network robustness, there appear to be inadequate
analytical tools to study the robustness for WSN scenarios. In
our work, we derive the exact formulas of network criticality
to study the network robustness for WSNs. We adopt the
network criticality metric to quantify network robustness and
derive a new measure of robustness in terms of network
parameters. To study the network robustness of WSNs, we
use r-nearest neighbor networks [14], [15], a well known
class of distance-regular networks with a varying number
of direct neighbors. Lattice networks (see, e.g., [16], [17],
[18], and [19]) and r-nearest neighbor networks are simple
structures which allow theoretical analysis that incorporates
important parameters like connectivity, scalability, network
size, and node failures. These structures are quite useful for
measuring and monitoring purposes in sensor networks [20].
Our analytic approach drastically decreases the computational
complexity over the existing graph-theoretic metrics. These
kind of analyses play a vital role in the initial stage of wireless
networks design and also more reliable than simulation based
evaluations. Furthermore, we use the probability switching
[21] and weight design approaches to study the effects of node
dynamics and asymmetric weights on network robustness
respectively. The structure of a WSN is highly dynamic, as
the WSNs are subject to node or link failures due to the
low-power batteries of sensors or environmental changes.
Hence, assuming WSN as a static network cannot model
the applications which involve mobility [1], [13]. Wireless
channels in low power wireless networks (such as WSNs)
are known to be time-varying, unreliable, and asymmetric
(see, e.g., [22], [23], [24], and [25]). Hence, modeling WSN
as a undirected graph may wrongly designate the network’s
performance. To show the effects of asymmetric link weights,
we consider ring topology for the ease of evaluation.
In summary, our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) In Section III, we derive the exact formulas of network
criticality using r-nearest neighbor networks to compute
network criticality in terms of network parameters.
2) In Section IV, we study the effect of link failures on
network robustness by means of probability switching.
3) In Section V, we introduce the parameter  and derive the
network criticality expression for asymmetric ring network.
4) In Section VI, we verify our analytical expressions
with the extensive simulations in MATLAB and propose a
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2optimization framework to minimize the network robustness
while limiting the power consumption.
II. SPECTRAL GRAPH THEORY
Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph with the set of nodes
V = {1, 2, ......n}, edge set E ⊆ V × V , and an adjacency
matrix A consists of non-negative elements aij . The degree
matrix D is expressed as D = diag[di], where di =
n∑
j=1
aij .
The Laplacian matrix L is a n× n symmetric matrix defined
as L = D −A, where each entry in L is expressed as
lij = lji =
{
deg(vi) if j = i,
−aij if j 6= i. (1)
Inspiring from Darwin’s survival value, the theory of network
criticality has been developed in [9]. A survival value quan-
tifies the adaptability of network to unexpected variations.
Network criticality is defined as the average random walk
betweenness of a link or node normalized by its weight.
Random Walk Betweenness measures how many times a node
appears on random walks between all node-pairs in the graph.
A random-walk starts from a source node s, chooses one of
its neighbors with equal probabilities and continues traveling
until it reaches the destination d. So the betweenness bst(d)
of a node t for source-destination pair s-d is the expected
number of times that a packet passes via node t in it’s journey
from source s to destination d. Node criticality ηk is defined
as the random-walk betweenness of node over the weight of
the node.
ηk =
bk
wk
,
where bk, wk are the betweenness and weight of node k.
Similarly, link betweenness ηij is defined as the betweenness
of the link over its weight.
ηij =
bij
wij
,
where bij , wij are the betweenness and weight of link (i, j).
The parameter weight captures link quality and models the
QOS parameters like Bandwidth, Packet loss etc.
The probability of passing node or link k in the next step is
expressed as
pst(d) =
{
0 if s = d
wst∑
q∈A(s)
wsq
Otherwise,
where A(s) is the direct neighbor nodes of s and wst is the
weight of link (s, t).
Definition 1: Network criticality (τ) [9] quantifies the
network robustness that captures the effect of environmental
changes in communication networks. It is expressed as
τ = 2nTr(L+), (2)
where Tr(L+) represents trace of the Moore-Penrose inverse
of Laplacian matrix.
Fig. 1. 2-nearest neighbor cycle
III. r-NEAREST NEIGHBOR NETWORKS
In r-nearest neighbor networks, a communication link exists
between every pair of nodes that are r hops away. In this
section, we derive the network criticality expressions for
r-nearest neighbor cycle, r-nearest neighbor torus, and m
dimensional r-nearest neighbor torus networks.
Definition 2: The (j + 1)th eigenvalue [26] of a circulant
matrix circ{a1, a2......an} is defined as
λj = a1 + a2ω
j + ..............+ anω
(n−1)j , (3)
where ω = e
2pii
n and {ai}ni=1 are row entries of circulant
matrix.
A. r-Nearest Neighbor Cycle
The one dimensional wireless sensor network topology can
be modeled by r-nearest neighbor cycle Crn.
Lemma 1: The (j + 1)th eigenvalue of a Laplacian matrix L
of Crn is
λj(L) = 2r − 2
r∑
j=1
cos
2pij
n
, (4)
where j = 0, 1, 2......(n− 1).
P roof : The Laplacian matrix of Crn can be written as
L = circ{2r−1− 1− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r times
......0, 0.....−1− 1− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r times
}. (5)
Using equation (3) and (5), we obtain equation (4).
Theorem 1: Network criticality τ of a r-nearest neighbor
cycle Crn is given by
τ(Crn) =
n−1∑
j=1
2n
2r + 1− sin
(2r+1)pij
n
sin pijn
. (6)
Proof : Substituting the equation (4) in (2), we get
τ(Crn) =
n−1∑
j=1
2n
2r − 2
r∑
i=1
cos
(
2piji
n
) . (7)
Definition 3: Dirichlet kernel is defined as
1 + 2
r∑
j=1
cos(jx) =
sin
(
r + 12
)
x
sin
(
x
2
) . (8)
We obtain (6), by substituting equation (8) in (7).
3Fig. 2. Torus Network
B. r-Nearest Neighbor Torus
The cartesian product of two r-nearest cycles results in r-
nearest neighbor torus. A two dimensional 1-nearest neighbor
torus is as shown in Fig. 2.
Lemma 2: The (j1+j2+1)th eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix
of r-nearest neighbor torus T rk1,k2 is
λj1,j2(L
r
k1,k2) = 4r−2
r∑
i=1
cos
(
2pij1i
k1
)
−2
r∑
i=1
cos
(
2pij2i
k1
)
,
(9)
where j1 = 0, 1, 2, ...(k1 − 1), j2 = 0, 1, 2, ...(k2 − 1).
Proof : The Laplacian matrix of T rk1,k2 can be written as
L = circ{Lk1 + 2rIk1 Ik1 Ik1 ..... Ik1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r times
....... Ik1 Ik1 ..... Ik1︸ ︷︷ ︸
r times
}
(10)
From (3) and (10), we obtain
λj1,j2(L
r
k1,k2) = λj1(L
r
k1) + 2r − 2
r∑
i=1
cos
(
2pij2i
k2
)
(11)
By substituting equation (4) into (11), we obtain equation (9).
C. m-dimensional r-nearest neighbor torus
Lemma 3: The generalized expression for eigenvalue of
Laplacian matrix of m-dimensional r-nearest neighbor torus
is
λj1,j2,...jm(L
r
k1,k2,..km) = 2mr − 2
r∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
cos
(
2piji
ki
)
.
(12)
where ji = 0, 1, 2......(ki − 1).
P roof : The (j1+j2+j3+1)th eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix
L for 3-dimensional r-nearest neighbor torus T rk1,k2,k3 is
λ(Lrk1,k2,k3) = 6r − 2
3∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
cos
(
2piji
ki
.
)
(13)
Without loss of generality, by observing (13) and (9), we can
write (12) for variable m.
Theorem 2: The network criticality of r-nearest neighbor
torus T rk1,k2 between every arbitrary pair of nodes is
τ(T rk1,k2) =
k1−1∑
j1=1
k2−1∑
j2=0
 2n(
(4r+2)−
sin
(2r+1)pij1
k1
sin
pij1
k1
−
sin
(2r+1)pij2
k2
sin
pij2
k2
)
.
(14)
Proof : Using (2) and (12), the network criticality of T rk1,k2
can be written as
τ(T rk1,k2) =
k1−1∑
j1=0
k2−1∑
j2=1
2n
4r−2
r∑
i=1
cos
(
2pij1i
k1
)
−2
r∑
i=1
cos
(
2pij2i
k1
) .
(15)
To get (14), we further simplify equation (15) using (8).
Without loss of generality, we write the network criticality of
T rk1,k2,....km as
τ(T rk1,k2,....km) =
k1−1∑
j1=1
k2−1∑
j2=0
......
km−1∑
jm=0
 2(2r+1)m− m∑
i=1
sin
(2r+1)piji
ki
sin
piji
ki

.
(16)
D. Computational Complexity
O(n) denotes the asymptotic upper bound and it says that
the limit of a function when the argument tends towards
infinity. Time complexity for calculating τ using equation
(2) is O(n3), which is prohibited for large scale WSNs.
Specifically, our approach overcomes this disadvantage and
also effective to study the network robustness for large sized
networks.
E. Asymptotic Results
In this section, we derive the network criticality expressions
for n→∞.
Theorem 3: The network criticality of Crn when n→∞ is
τ(Crn) ≈
n3
2r(r + 1)(2r + 1)
. (17)
Proof : Proof is technical and deferred to Appendix A.
Theorem 4: The network criticality of T rk1,k2 when r  n is
τ(T rk1,k2) ≈
3n3Θ(log n)
8r(r + 1)(2r + 1)pi2
(18)
Proof : Proof is technical and deferred to Appendix B.
IV. DYNAMIC NETWORK ANALYSIS
To study the effect of link failures and switching neighbors,
we use the probability switching method proposed in [21].
Here, we consider a n node ring network, where every time
instant, graph Gi is selected with probability pi. Since at each
time instant, graph topology is selected identically distributed
and independent of the previous topologies, the average of the
stochastic matrices will be evaluated.
A. Random Communication Links
In a n-node ring network, if each link exists between
any two nodes with probability q, then the link is selected
independently. Then adjacency matrix A of a random ring
network is written as
A = circ{0 q q .............q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
}, (19)
4D = circ{q(n− 1) 0 0 .............0}, (20)
Using equations (19) and (20), L is expressed as
L = circ{q(n− 1) −q − q .............− q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
}. (21)
From equations (3) and (21), (j + 1)th eigenvalue can be
written as
λj = q
(n− 1)− (n−1)∑
k=1
e
2piijk
n
. (22)
Thus, substituting equation (22) in equation (2) gives
τ =
n−1∑
j=1
1
q
(
(n− 1)−
(n−1)∑
k=1
e
2piijk
n .
) (23)
For n = odd, equation (23) can be further simplified as
τ =
n−1∑
j=1
2n
q
(
n− sinpij
sin pijn
) . (24)
B. Identically Independent Link Losses due to Communication
Failures
To study the link failures in WSNs, we assume that each
link in a ring network is fails with a probability p. These link
failures occur independently with respect to other link failures.
Then adjacency matrix A can be written as
A¯ = circ{0 (1− p) 0 0........ 0 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−3
(1− p)}, (25)
Degree matrix D is given by
D = circ{2(1− p) 0 0 .............0}, (26)
Using equation (25) and equation (26), we get L as
L¯ = circ{2(1− p) − (1− p) 0 0........ 0 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−3
−(1− p)},
(27)
Using equation (3) and equation (27), we obtain (j + 1)th
eigenvalue as
λj = 2(1− p)(1− cos 2pij
n
). (28)
Substituting the equation (28) in equation (2), results in
τ =
n−1∑
j=1
n
(1− p) (1− cos 2pijn ) . (29)
C. Topology switch due to changing neighbors
The frequent topology changes due to node failures is quite
often in wireless sensor network operations. To study the effect
of change in neighbors, we consider a n-node ring network
with n-time slots. Every time each node chooses two neighbors
Fig. 3. Asymmetric Ring Network
bidirectionally with equal probability. In this case, adjacency
matrix A is
A = circ{0 2
n− 1
2
n− 1 .............
2
n− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
}. (30)
Hence, the degree matrix D is given by
D = circ{2 0 0 .............0} . (31)
Using equations (30) and (31), we get Laplacian matrix L as
L = circ{2 − 2
n− 1 .............−
2
n− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−1
}. (32)
From equations (3) and (32), we obtain (j + 1)th eigenvalue
as
λj = 2− 2
n− 1
n−1∑
i=1
e
2pijki
n . (33)
Substituting equation (33) in equation (2) results in
τ =
n−1∑
j=1
n
1− 1(n−1)
n−1∑
i=1
e
2pikij
n
. (34)
For n = odd, τ can be further simplified as
τ =
n−1∑
j=1
n
1− 1(n−1)
(
sinpik
sin pikn
− 1
) . (35)
V. ASYMMETRIC WEIGHT ANALYSIS
In this section, we compute the network criticality of a
asymmetric ring network. Asymmetric ring network can be
modeled as a directed graph, where we assume that forward
link weight is ‘1′ and the backward link weight is ‘′ as shown
in Fig. 3.
Theorem 5: The network criticality τ of asymmetric ring
network is given by
τ =
n−1∑
j=2
1
1 + ε− (1 + ε) cos 2pijn − i(1− ε) sin 2pijn
(36)
5Proof : Laplacian matrix L of a asymmetric ring network is
L = circ{(1 + ε) − 1 0 0.....0 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−3
−ε} (37)
Using equation (3) and equation (37), (j+1)th eigenvalue can
be expressed as
λj(L) = 1 + ε− (1 + ε) cos 2pij
n
− i(1 + ε) sin 2pij
n
(38)
Substituting equation (38) in (2), proves the theorem.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the analytical results to study
the effect of network parameters, link losses, topological
changes, random links, and asymmetric links on the network
robustness. The effectiveness of of analytical expressions have
been verified with the extensive simulations using MATLAB.
We have plotted τ versus n, for r=1 in Fig. 4. We observe
that τ increases exponentially from n=25. So it has to be
noted that large scale sensor networks exhibit less robustness
to topology changes. In Fig. 5, τ versus r, has been plotted
and we can observe a rapid decrease of τ values at r=5.
Because the node or link betweenness decreases with the
nearest neighbors when n is constant. From r=5, τ values are
too low and almost constant despite the increase in r values.
This result is justified as the r values increase the network
connectivity and a fully connected network always ensures
high robustness to topology changes. Similarly, to understand
the network criticality of a torus network, we have plotted
τ versus k1 and k2 as shown in Fig. 6. We observe that,
τ increases exponentially with the number of nodes in two
dimensions. For k1=k2=300, τ versus r plot can be seen in
Fig. 7, and we find that for r-nearest neighbor torus network,
a significant decay of τ values for r=5. We have also noticed
that from r = 5, τ values are almost constant. To investigate
the effect of network dimension m on τ , we have plotted the
Fig. 8, for k1=16, k2=18, k3=20, and k4=22. We have noticed
that WSN applications work in multiple dimensions with high
r values exhibit high robustness to topology changes. In Fig. 9,
we have compared the static ring network with the topologies
discussed in Section IV for p = q = 0.2. We have observed that
network robustness is drastically increases with the topology
switching between nodes and random WSNs exhibits more
robustness than static networks. In Fig. 10, we have plotted the
τ against n for p = q = 0.7 to see the effect of communication
link probabilities p and q on τ . We have observed that increase
in probability q of link existence results in increase of network
robustness, whereas probability of link failures p reduces the
network robustness exponentially. As shown in Fig. 11, we
have plotted τ versus n, varying  values from 0 to 1. We
observe that τ values increases with the , which reveals that
network robustness increases with asymmetric link weights.
A. Network Robustness-Overhead Optimization
As shown in the Figs.5 and 7, network criticality τ increases
with r. But the node’s power consumption P [17] is
P =
(
r√
n
)α
, (39)
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Fig. 4. Comparison of Theoretical and Simulation results of τ versus n for
r-nearest neighbor cycle (r = 1).
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Fig. 5. Comparison of Theoretical and Simulation results of τ versus r for
r-nearest neighbor cycle (n = 300).
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Fig. 6. τ versus k1 and k2 for r-nearest neighbor cycle (r = 2).
where α is a path-loss exponent. Since WSNs consist of
limited-battery powered nodes, it is necessary to minimize the
τ without effecting the power consumption P . So to handle
this trade off, an optimization framework has been proposed
to minimize the τ subject to total power consumption P
constraint or minimizing the P subject to τ .
minimize τ
subject to r ≤ rmax, P ≤ Pmax,
or
minimize P
subject to τ ≤ τmax, r ≤ rmax.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of Theoretical and Simulation results of τ versus r for
r-nearest neighbor torus (k1 = k2=300).
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here rmax, τmax, and Pmax are the maximum allowed values
defined based on WSN resource requirements. The above
problems can be solved by suitable optimization tools.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have derived the analytical expressions
of network criticality for m-dimensional WSNs to study the
network robustness. The derived analytical expressions reduce
the computational complexity compared to the existing metrics
based on graph-theoretic concepts. We have also studied the
effect of number of nodes, nearest neighbors, and network di-
mension on network robustness. We have shown that network
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Fig. 11. τ versus n for Asymmetric Ring Network.
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Fig. 12. τ versus n for  variation.
robustness decreases with the number of nodes in large scale
WSNs and exponentially increases with the nearest neighbors.
This result is well justified as the number of nearest neighbors
or network dimension is inversely proportional to the node or
link betweenness. Since the sensor node’s power consumption
is increases with the nearest neighbors, WSNs face strict trade-
off between the network robustness and power consumption.
We have proved that probability of link failures drastically
reduces the network robustness. We have also proved that
asymmetric link weights increase the network robustness.
Furthermore, the proposed optimization framework can be
used in network control and optimization problems.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Taylor series expansion for sin(2r+1)xsin x at x = 0, can be
written as (2r + 1)− 23r(r + 1)(2r + 1)x2.
So, we can rewrite equation (6) as
τ(Crn) =
n∑
j=2
2n
(2r + 1)− sin
(2r+1)pij
n
sin pijn
≈ 3n
3
r(r + 1)(2r + 1)pi2
n∑
j=2
1
j2
(40)
Substituting the below identity in equation (40) proves the
theorem. ∞∑
n=1
1
n2
=
pi2
6
. (41)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
After substituting the k1 = k2 = n2 in equation (14), we
obtain
τ(T rn) =
n
2−1∑
j1=0
n
2−1∑
j2=1
2n(
(4r+2)− sin
(2r+1)2pij1
n
sin
2pij1
n
− sin
(2r+1)2pij2
n
sin
2pij2
n
)
(42)
From Taylor series expansion, we can rewrite equation (42) as
τ(T rn) =
n
2−1∑
j1=0
n
2−1∑
j2=1
3n3
8r(r + 1)(2r + 1)pi2(j21 + j
2
2)
≈ 3n
3
8r(r + 1)(2r + 1)pi2
n
2−1∑
j1=0
n
2−1∑
j2=1
1
(j21 + j
2
2)
≈ 3n
3
8r(r + 1)(2r + 1)pi2
n
2−1∑
j1=0
n
2−1∫
j2=1
1
(j21 + j
2
2)
(43)
for 1 n and 0 < tan−1 x ≤ pi2 , we get
n∫
0
n∫
1
1
j21 + j
2
1
dj1dj2 ≈
n∫
1
Θ
(
1
j1
)
dj1 = Θ(log n), (44)
So equation(44) can be approximated as
τ(T rn) ≈
3n3Θ(log n)
8r(r + 1)(2r + 1)pi2
. (45)
